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ARTICLE

Assessing Transnational Private Regulation of
the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA,
and the Future of Financial Reform
GABRIEL V. RAUTERBERG & ANDREW VERSTEIN*

For the last twenty years, the dominant narrative of the over-the-counter
derivatives market has been one of absent regulation, deregulation, and
regulatory conflict, predictably resulting in disaster. This Article challenges this
narrative, arguing that the global derivatives market has been subject to
pervasive and harmonized regulation by what should be recognized as
transnational private regulators. Recognizing the reality of widespread
transnational private regulation of derivatives has significant implications, which
this Article explores. Appreciating the actual regulatory status quo is essential
if policymakers are to correctly diagnose problems, avoid past regulatory errors,
and plan effective remedies. There are also advantages to relying on private
transnational regulation, as increased governmental effort to regulate the OTC
derivatives space may undermine and fracture existing regulation. To be sure,
private transnational regulation carries risks that have sometimes materialized,
such as the manipulation of LIBOR. Thus, this Article also evaluates best
practices in regulating through transnational private governance.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a consensus that in order to avoid the mistakes that
precipitated the global financial crisis, new and internationally coordinated
regulatory solutions are needed.1 Indeed, both proposals and recently
enacted legislation have already dramatically altered the regulatory
requirements for major commercial and investment banks, as well as
targeted the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets, which have been
viewed as a key causal factor in the crisis.2 The narrative for the OTC
derivatives market has almost uniformly been described in the following
manner: for the last twenty years it was a largely unregulated market, and
this lack of regulation was key to the role OTC derivatives played in
causally contributing to the financial crisis and subsequent market woes. In
brief, OTC derivatives were deregulated and this led to disaster — or so
the story goes.
This narrative, however, is incorrect and dangerously so. We dedicate
the first part of this Article to demonstrating why. The basic contours of
this argument have been noted by other derivatives scholars in recent
work. Far from being unregulated, the OTC derivatives market was subject
to pervasive regulation and governance, although by transnational private
regulators rather than government. Most prominently, these private
1. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
(2011),
available
at
http://fcicstatic.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf.
2. See infra notes 37, 39.
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regulators have been the International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA) and the British Bankers’ Association (BBA). Indeed, we argue that
the U.S. and U.K. governments are best understood as having consciously
chosen to regulate the OTC derivatives through reliance on transnational
private regulation.
We join with other scholars of the OTC derivatives market in finding it
crucial to appreciate the significance of its underlying transnational private
regulatory structure. But we go further in asking about the implications of
understanding the underlying regulatory structure of the OTC derivatives
market. This Article is about assessing these implications — for
harmonization, reform, and responsibility — of taking transnational
private regulation seriously. We make a series of arguments concerning
lessons to be learned from ISDA and the BBA, ways to improve the
regulation of derivatives, and the promise of governmental leveraging of
transnational private regulation. Above all, we conclude that we cannot
hope for better, more successful regulation — and to avert the next
financial crisis — until we understand and appreciate the actual regulatory
character of the past two decades.

I.

TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION OF OTC DERIVATIVES

This Section begins by introducing the OTC derivatives market. It then
describes the view of the OTC market as unregulated. Next, it considers
the possibility of transnational private (i.e. non-state) regulation of the
OTC market. Finally, we examine the ways in which the OTC market can
be considered to have been subject to extensive transnational private
regulation.

A.

Introduction to Derivatives

Financial derivatives are investment instruments that derive their value
from some other financial asset.3 For example, a call option, a type of
derivative, gives the owner of the option the privilege, but not the
obligation, to purchase a specified asset at a specified price at some future
date. That privilege may someday be of great value if the underlying asset
appreciates, in which case the right to purchase it at a low price represents
a guaranteed profit. On the other hand, if the underlying asset depreciates,
the call option is unlikely to be used to any gain. Since the call option is an
alienable asset, its sale price will reflect in some way the movement in price
of the underlying asset.
3. ALAN N. RECHTSCHAFFEN, CAPITAL MARKETS, DERIVATIVES AND THE LAW 159 (2009) (“A
derivatives transaction is ‘a bilateral contract . . . whose value derives . . . from the value of an
underlying asset or underlying reference rate or index.’”).
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Financial derivatives serve at least three purposes for their users. First,
they can be used to hedge, or offset, risk.4 Farmers have long used futures,
obligations to deliver a given asset at some upcoming date, to lock in their
profits now and avoid the volatility of the market for their crop. Swaps,
which are promises on the part of two parties to exchange a stream of
payments, are now used by the majority of large firms to reduce their
interest-rate risk. Companies agree to pay a fixed rate to their bank in
exchange for a payment stream that varies with the interest rate, thus
assuring themselves an income stream that will vary inversely to their
borrowing costs.
Second, derivatives are also used for speculation. Call options can be a
more cost-effective way to bet on the appreciation of a security than the
direct purchase of the security. Call options entitle their owner to similar
gains akin to owning the underlying security, but with a lower initial cost.5
Similar derivatives allow investors to cheaply bet that a security will decline
in value, or simply change in some direction.6
Finally, derivatives can be used for a variety of arbitrage activities.
Arbitrage refers to investment or business activity that notes the economic
similarity between two seemingly different assets. The notorious hedge
fund Long-Term Capital Management used financial derivatives to bet that
the prices of similar assets would eventually converge.7 Arbitrage can also
be regulatory: where a transaction has substantial regulatory costs,
derivatives may sometimes be used to reconstruct the transaction in terms
not covered by the regulation, preserving the economics of the transaction
but avoiding the regulation.8 For example, a corporation may incur tax
liability if it sells a given security. Instead of selling the security, the
corporation may initiate a total return swap in which it promises to pay
another party an amount reflecting any change in value in the asset, in
exchange for a fee. Now the corporation has achieved the equivalent of a
sale but has not actually “sold” anything for regulatory purposes.
4. See generally id. at 159–73.
5. Access to similar returns comes paired with a greater risk of no return at all. If the option
expires while the security’s price is below the option’s strike price, the investor receives no payment
at all.
6. A “straddle” is a combination of a call and a put option that rewards its owner if the security’s
price changes in either direction.
7. See ROGER K. LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000).
8. See MERTON H. MILLER, MERTON MILLER ON DERIVATIVES 6 (1997) (explaining and
praising regulatory arbitrage); Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1661–67 (2008) (arguing that although bank
loans and standby letters of credit expose banks to similar credit risks, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) treated standby letters of credit to the more favorable regulatory treatment of
regular letters of credit. In this way, the OCC created a profitable regulatory arbitrage for banks to
issue standby letters of credit rather than make loans).
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Derivatives come in two well-recognized forms: exchange-traded and
over-the-counter. The former are standardized contracts traded on
regulated exchanges, such as the Chicago Board Options Exchange. The
latter are bilateral, designed for customizability, and comprise the vast
proportion of the derivatives market.9
Given the OTC market’s focus on customization, it is perhaps
surprising how closely different OTC swaps resemble one another. This
notable fact is largely a result of the standardization of customizable terms
provided by ISDA’s Master Agreement form contracts and accompanying
documentation. Hundreds of trillions of dollars of OTC derivatives are
governed by documents written by a single organization, the ISDA, and
derive their payments from a single rate governed by another, the BBA.
These two organizations are critical in generating the infrastructure that
has ordered transactions in the OTC derivatives markets for much of the
last two decades — an infrastructure that provides the multiple economic
benefits of liquidity, certainty, and reduced transaction costs.10
ISDA is “the largest global financial trade association,”11 with over 800
members from fifty-five countries.12 ISDA’s trade documentation is the
market norm for OTC derivatives,13 and the organization exercises
tremendous influence over the form that transactions take.14 As just one
9. See, e.g., Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1300 (2010) (citations omitted) (“OTC derivative markets are many
times the size of exchange-traded markets and compromise [sic] roughly eighty-three percent of the
derivative market.”).
10. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 3, at 172–73.
11. David Mengle, Concentration of OTC Derivatives Among Major Dealers, ISDA RESEARCH NOTES,
no. 4, 2010, at 7, available at http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/ConcentrationRN_4-10.pdf.
12. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA: SAFE, EFFICIENT, MARKETS (2011),
http://www.isda.org/uploadfiles/_docs/ISDA_Brochure_2011.pdf.
13. See, e.g., BNP PARIBAS, OTC DERIVATIVES: THE CHALLENGE OF DERIVING CLEAR
BENEFITS
18,
available
at
http://securities.bnpparibas.com/jahia/webdav/site/portal/shared/documents/Market%20Insight/
White-paper-OTC-Derivatives.pdf (“the bilateral agreement adopted between two counterparties
dealing OTC derivatives is typically the master agreement published by the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA).”); INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, MARKET REVIEW OF OTC
DERIVATIVE BILATERAL COLLATERALIZATION PRACTICES 9 (2010) (“OTC derivative transactions
are commonly documented pursuant to either a 1992 Multi-Currency Cross Border ISDA Master
Agreement (the 1992 Agreement) or a 2002 ISDA Master Agreement”).
14. See, e.g., Adam J. Krippel, Regulatory Overhaul of the OTC Derivatives Market: The Costs, Risks and
Politics, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 269, 280 (2011) (“The International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, Inc. (‘ISDA’) provides a standard form agreement called the ‘ISDA Master
Agreement’ that most market participants use for their OTC derivatives transactions.”);; Adam Glass,
Helpful Hints for the New Derivatives Regulators, FINREG21.COM (Aug. 31, 2009),
http://www.finreg21.com/lombard-street/helpful-hints-new-derivatives-regulators (explaining that
ISDA “is the forum in which the swap dealers and other market participants create and administer
the terms and conditions of every major class of OTC derivative. It publishes and updates standard
contract terms, takes positions or seeks outside counsel on interpretive questions under those
standardized terms, and, in the case of credit derivatives, is single-handedly responsible for rewriting
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indicator of the extent of ISDA’s penetration, eighty-five percent of the
approximately 138,000 collateral agreements in use in the OTC derivative
market at the end of 2011 were ISDA agreements.15 “The [ISDA] Master
Agreement serves as an industry-standard contract available for off-theshelf use by counterparties.”16
The importance of the BBA over the last two decades is similarly
indisputable.17 The BBA’s importance to the derivatives market began in
1986 when it first published a daily interest-rate benchmark called the BBA
London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR).18 Assembled from banks’ selfevaluated borrowing costs, LIBOR is meant to provide insight into the
cost of funds in the most liquid market in the world. Because of the
importance of the banks that operate in the London market, LIBOR is
thought to correlate with interest rates all around the world. That
benchmark rate is now the price term in essentially all USD-, Yen-, and
Sterling-denominated OTC derivatives.19
Although they are small private entities, ISDA and the BBA produce
standards of tremendous public influence and importance:20 the standard
form documentation that is the norm for the OTC derivatives market, and
the rate by which hundreds of trillions of dollars in interest-rate
derivatives are traded.

the standard terms of credit derivatives, and changing the market practices under which they are
traded and settled”), reprinted in http://creditriskchronicles.blogspot.com/2009/08/helpful-hints-fornew-derivatives.html.
15. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA MARGIN SURVEY 2012 3 (2012), available at
https://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/surveys/margin-surveys/.
16. RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 3, at 173.
17. Interestingly, there is some overlap between ISDA and the BBA. ISDA grew out of efforts in
the early 1980s to standardize OTC derivatives. Among early efforts, the British Bankers’ Association
formed an Interest Rate Swap Working Party and Forward Rate Agreement Working Party that
developed a set of standardized terms for interest rate swaps and forwards. GuyLaine Charles, The
ISDA Master Agreement — Part I: Architecture, Risks and Compliance, PRAC. COMPLIANCE & RISK
MGMT.
FOR
SEC.
INDUS.,
Jan.
2012,
at
25,
25–26,
available
at
http://www.teiglandhunt.com/webcp/assets/rtarticles/pdf/77.pdf. The BBA formed in 1920
through the merger of two other banking organizations but remained insignificant until the 1970s.
Until that time, it addressed issues only on an ad hoc basis and shared staff with another industry
group. Jane A. Sargent, Pressure Group Development in the EC: The Role of the British Bankers’ Association,
20 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 269, 271 (1982).
18. Historical Perspective, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/explained/historical-perspective
(last visited June 9, 2013). LIBOR is, of course, best known to most people as the site of probable
manipulation. See infra notes 39–44.
19. See, e.g., Michael Fleming et al., An Analysis of OTC Interest Rate Derivatives Transactions: Implications for Public Reporting, 557 FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REPORTS 1, 12 (Oct. 2012),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr557.pdf.
20. Anna Gelpern, Commentary, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 57, 63–64 (2009) (citing ISDA Staff Information, ISDA, http://isda.org/wwa/staff.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2009)) (“During
the summer of 2008, ISDA had a staff of about seventy, most of them in New York and London.”).
BBA LIBOR has always had a staff in the low single-digits.
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The Dominant Narrative

Despite a growing chorus claiming that the OTC derivatives market has
been subject to private regulation,21 much discussion of this market has
generally assumed that it was essentially unregulated, or subject to rapid
wholesale deregulation — and regulatory inactivity where regulation was
possible22 — on both sides of the Atlantic.23 This version of history has
familiar milestones. In 1989, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commision (CFTC) provided a “safe harbor” from regulation for most
OTC swaps.24 In 1992, Congress followed suit and gave the CFTC general
exemptive power over swaps.25 At that time, the size of the OTC market
was about $12 trillion, notional, excluding the foreign exchange market.26
In 1993, Metallgeschaft AG, Germany’s fourteenth-largest corporation,
lost $1.3 billion in derivatives transactions.27 That same year, a G30 report
on the OTC market advised no new state regulation, but instead provided
extensive commentary on best practices that the private sector itself could
implement.28 That report was directed by officers at JP Morgan, ISDA,
and others.29
The cornerstone of the deregulatory narrative was laid in the late 1990s.
In a momentary reversal of the trend up until this point, the CFTC issued
a Concept Release announcing its intentions to increase scrutiny of OTC
derivatives in 1998.30 The reaction was swift. Congress responded with the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA), enacted in 2000,31 which
is typically characterized as a “sweeping deregulation of OTC derivative
21. See infra Part I.D.
22. Dan Awrey, The FSA, Integrated Regulation, and the Curious Case of OTC Derivatives, 13 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 1, 33 (2010) (“Not surprisingly, the enactment of the [Commodity Futures Modernization
Act] ushered in a period of relative inactivity in the U.S. with respect to the regulation of OTC
derivatives markets. This regulatory stasis stood in stark contrast, however, with the precipitous
growth and proliferation of OTC derivatives markets.”).
23. Id. at 46–47 (The U.K.’s Financial Services Authority is also non-interventionist).
24. Policy Statement Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694, 30,694–95 (July 21,
1989).
25. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 502, 106 Stat. 3590 (1992).
26. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES:
ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 34 (1994).
27. ROBERT M. CONROY, MG REFINING & MARKETING, INC. (A) 1 (Univ. of Va., Darden
Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin. ed., 1998 rev. 2000), available at http://faculty.darden.virginia.edu/
conroyb/IESE/2002/f-1227.pdf; ANAND SHETTY & JOHN MANLEY, METALLGESELLSCHAFT’S
HEDGING DEBACLE 2, available at http://userwww.sfsu.edu/ibec/papers/39.pdf (last visited June 8,
2013).
28. WORKING GRP. ON GLOBAL DERIVATIVES, DERIVATIVES PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES
(1993) [hereinafter G30 PAPER].
29. Id. at *7.
30. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES (1998),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm.
31. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 1(a)(5), app. E § 1(a),
114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-366 (2000).
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activity.”32 Among other things, the CFMA specified that OTC swaps
between sophisticated parties could be transacted off of regulated
exchanges and exempt from most of the Commodity Exchange Act.
Turf wars between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
CFTC may have also contributed to a lack of aggressive governmental
regulation.33 From its founding, the CFTC and the SEC were at odds
about the proper shape and distribution of regulation in their respective
areas, as well as the borders of those jurisdictions. In 1982, the Shad–
Johnson Accord, named for the agency heads who helped cobble together
an uneasy truce, gave regulatory authority over options on individual
securities to the SEC and the rest to the CFTC.34 This trend of
governmental inaction has also been explained by large lobbying
expenditures by the finance industry,35 which succeeded in spreading a
pro-financial innovation ideology and beating back regulation wherever it
could.
This apparent absence of regulation of financial instruments generally,36
and of derivatives in particular, has been cited as a major catalyst of the
global financial crisis.37 Without regulation, derivatives users were free to
take imprudent risks, sometimes with the encouragement of brokers and
advisors who may not have held their clients’ interests very highly.38 With
the proliferation of an infinite variety of bespoke derivatives, it became
increasingly difficult to assess one’s indirect exposure to the failure of a
counterparty’s counterparty. The results of these trends were daisy chains
of risk and a reduction of available credit. As Professor Stout has put it,
“[i]t was the deregulation of financial derivatives that brought the banking
system to its knees.”39

32. Baker, supra note 9, at 1299.
33. See Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives
Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 319, 356–66 (2003);
RECHTSHAFFEN, supra note 3, at 195 (describing jurisdictional disputes between the CFTC and SEC).
34. RECHTSHAFFEN, supra note 3, at 195.
35. Baker, supra note 9, at 1311.
36. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Listen to the IMF, America, SLATE (May 5, 2011, 1:04 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/project_syndicate/2011/05/listen_to_the_imf_america.sin
gle.html (“Financial deregulation in the United States was a prime cause of the global crisis that
erupted in 2008 . . . .”).
37. See Krippel, supra note 14, at 278; see also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 1, at 52–66
(describing various deregulatory changes and arguing they causally contributed to the financial crisis).
38. For example, consider the now-infamous Abacus transaction. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to
Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010123.htm.
39. Lynn A. Stout, How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Re-Regulating Them Can
Prevent Another, LOMBARD STREET, July 6, 2009, at 4, http://www.finreg21.com/files/finreg21finreg21/Lombard%207.pdf.
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A similar story of deregulation (and disaster) is also frequently told
about the most important interest-rate benchmark in the world — LIBOR.
It is by now well known that at least one of the major banks contributing
to the setting of LIBOR also manipulated it.40 This manipulation was
possible in part because of the way that LIBOR was compiled: each day,
the BBA would ask six or more large banks “at what rate could you
borrow funds . . . in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?”41 The
BBA discarded the top and bottom quartile of answers and averaged the
remaining answers. This trimmed mean methodology was meant to
eliminate problematic outliers from this benchmark of bank borrowing
costs, but no data was required to substantiate banks’ answers to this broad
question, and there was clearly opportunity for an answering bank to tailor
its response in order to influence the average. The deregulatory narrative
suggests that the manipulation of LIBOR was due to the fact that it was
unregulated,42 and that mischief has thrived in the vacuum of regulation
since the early days of LIBOR.43 It does seem that there was no clear civil
and criminal liability applicable to benchmark manipulation in the United
Kingdom,44 or in most other jurisdictions.45
Private or poor regulation, however, is not deregulation, and only by
appreciating the OTC derivatives space in its full complexity can an
optimal regulatory strategy be designed. In the next Section, we lay out the
40. Others have admitted that their employees attempted to manipulate LIBOR. See generally,
Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure of Financial Indices, 30
YALE J. ON REG. 101 (2012).
41. The Basics, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/explained/the-basics (last visited June 11,
2013).
42. See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera, What’s Next to Watch in Libor Drama, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (July
9,
2012,
7:46
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303567704577516450784443534.html
(calling
LIBOR a “once-unregulated process”);; Damian Reece, Record Fines for Barclays Are Just the Beginning of
the
Libor
Scandal,
TELEGRAPH
(June
27,
2012,
8:58
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/damianreece/9360672/Record-fines-for-Barclaysare-just-the-beginning-of-the-Libor-scandal.html (“[I]t’s surprising that setting the rate for [LIBOR]
is unregulated.”);; Hibah Yousuf, Pressing the Reset Button on Libor, CNN MONEY (Sept. 27, 2012, 7:01
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/09/27/investing/libor-wheatley/index.html (quoting Martin
Wheatley as stating that, "[i]n hindsight, it now appears untenable for such an important process to
be unregulated.").
43. See, e.g., Sean Vanatta, Libor’s Risks Emerged from Clubby London Banking Culture, BLOOMBERG
(Aug. 14, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/libor-s-risks-emergedfrom-clubby-london-banking-culture.html (arguing that manipulation of “Libor,” as a general term
for interbank lending rates, predates the BBA LIBOR now used); see also Mary Campbell, Euromarkets
in Low Gear, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1974, at 26 (“Bank A agrees to quote a slightly above realistic
LIBOR for the purposes of fixing the rate payable by a customer of bank B — on the understanding
that bank B will do the same for bank A when the time comes.”).
44. HM TREASURY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT ¶ 2.30 (2012), available
at http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf [hereinafter THE
WHEATLEY REVIEW].
45. See, e.g., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, Discussion Paper on Benchmarks (on file with author).
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scholarly literature that has emerged concerning the reality of regulation by
non-state and private actors.
C.

Governance Outside the State

In October 2012, the U.K. government adopted a proposal that panel
bank submissions for the LIBOR rate should be unavailable to the public
for three months.46 The motivation behind the proposal was that initial
submission anonymity would permit contributor banks to more frankly
represent their cost of borrowing, and the U.K. government’s move
represented a paradigmatic attempt at incremental financial regulation.
More than four years earlier, the BBA had considered the same proposal
for the same reason. The BBA controlled the LIBOR-setting mechanism
and easily could have imposed the same scheme.47 If it had, it would have
in most respects been functionally identical in its operation, and it would
have similarly represented financial regulation, albeit by a private nonprofit rather than by a government.
The functional consequences of a supervisory directive can be identical
irrespective of whether the state or a private actor imposes it. Indeed, the
reality that rule-making for private entities by a non-governmental
institution can be regulation is widely acknowledged and allows for a far
richer and subtler analysis of the regulation applicable to any particular
arena of our financial markets. As Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite put it
over twenty years ago, “the intellectual stalemate between those who favor
strong state regulation of business and those who advocate deregulation”
is pejoratively academic, because financial participants themselves realized
that “regulation occurs in ‘many rooms’” and that “good regulatory policy
[involved] acceptance of the inevitability of some sort of symbiosis
between state regulation and self-regulation.”48 Different forms of this
broadened perspective on regulation have taken on various names across
time, from Reisman’s celebration of the New Haven School49 to more
recent New Governance scholarship.50
46. Press Release, HM Treasury, Gov’t Accepts Recommendations from the Wheatley Review of
LIBOR in Full (Oct. 17, 2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/governmentaccepts-recommendations-from-the-wheatley-review-of-libor-in-full; see also THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, ¶ 5.15. (“Real-time publication of submissions can create incentives to submit a
lower rate than would otherwise have been submitted.”). We will explore this proposal in greater
detail along with other relevant portions of the Wheatley Review.
47. BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, BBA LIBOR CONSULTATION FEEDBACK STATEMENT (2008)
[hereinafter BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, BBA LIBOR CONSULTATION], available at
http://www.bba.org.uk/media/article/bba-libor-review-consultation-feedback-statement/latestnews.
48. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 3 (1992).
49. W. Michael Reisman, International Law-making: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC. 101, 107 (1981) (New Haven School “liberates the inquirer from the limiting
and . . .
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Applications of this approach to private financial regulation have
already born fruit. Janet Koven Levit has explored an international trade
finance regime under the banner of what she calls “[b]ottom-up
lawmaking . . . [which does] not feature state policymakers but rather the
very practitioners — both public and private — who must roll up their
sleeves and grapple with the day-to-day technicalities of their trade.”51 A
process can become functionally regulated even where no sovereign authoritatively imposes the norms and practices.
D.

Transnational Private Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market

ISDA is well-recognized as a transnational private regulator. Indeed,
noting this feature has been one of the first and principal insights of
almost every scholar to survey the terrain of OTC derivatives.52 Some have
observed the private governance character of the OTC derivatives market
and have attempted to place it in a broader theoretical perspective.
Professor Baker has noted that “the Credit Derivative Determination
Committees of [ISDA] exemplify the highly successful and rapid growth

distorting model of positivism, which holds that law is made by the legislature,” but includes “any
communication between elites and politically relevant groups which shapes wide expectations about
appropriate future behavior.”); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,
106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2622 n.110 (1997).
50. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry SelfRegulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 417 (2011) (“The New Governance scholarship posits, generally,
that the traditional top-down model of regulation, in which the power to create rules belongs
exclusively to the state, is being replaced by a more flexible ‘governance’ model, in which power to
set and enforce the rules is increasingly diffused among a variety of societal actors working alongside
the governments.”); Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy:
The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 786
(2010).
51. Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade
Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125, 126 (2005); see also Peer Zumbansen, The Ins and Outs of
Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Legitimacy, Accountability, Effectiveness and a New Concept of
“Context,” 13 GERMAN L.J. 1269, 1278–79 (2012) (“Faced with a multitude of overlapping, fastevolving private regulatory governance regimes in areas ranging from financial to environmental
regulation, investment law or commercial transfers, lawyers must continue to both expand their
expertise with regard to specialized, technical transactional areas and appreciate the relevance of nonlegal ordering and regulatory concepts which underlie and inform many of the emerging governance
regimes.”).
52. See, e.g., Georgette Chapman Phillips, The Jumbled Alphabet Soup of the Collapsed Home Mortgage
Market: ABCP, CDO, CDS and RMBS, 18 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 143, 179 (2010) (“[A]s a selfregulating industry under the purview of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, the
derivatives market is a miserable failure.”);; Colin Scott, Beyond Taxonomies of Private Authority in
Transnational Regulation, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1326, 1329 (2012) (discussing ISDA’s standard-creating
process as transnational private regulation); Aaron Unterman, Perverse Incentives: Risk Taking and
Reform, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., June 2009, at 11, 19–20 (“The derivatives market
has grown to astonishing heights as a self-regulating industry under the purview of the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).”).
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of global private governance of the OTC derivative markets.”53 Professor
Biggins has echoed ISDA’s accomplishments in discussing its successful
standardization of OTC derivatives contracts, which has “result[ed] in the
creation and sustenance of a highly successful transnational private
regulatory regime.”54 Similarly, Professor Omarova, while arguing for a
new, more comprehensive understanding of financial self-regulation in the
wake of the financial crisis, used ISDA’s creation of standardized contracts
for OTC derivatives transactions as a “leading example of . . . efficiencyenhancing private industry self-regulation in today’s financial markets.”55
Professor Howell said that the swap market “has functioned surprisingly
well and constitutes what must be regarded as a premier example of
private regulation in financial markets.”56 Others have discussed private
regulation as the sole regulatory force in parts of the derivatives markets,
essentially replacing international regulatory agencies with the actual market participants.57
ISDA and the BBA’s roles as transnational private regulators can be seen
in its inputs (market constituents forming bureaucracies to design
governing rules, mirroring and working alongside state regulation), outputs
(regulatory directives and standardized documentation), results (a
harmonized and partially regulated market), and the way in which state
actors have deferred to them. ISDA has successfully imposed upon the
market a remarkable degree of regulation and harmonization of practices.
From the beginning, ISDA worked with the G30 to draw up detailed best
practices guidelines for the swap business.58 ISDA has also helped to
constrain insider trading in the derivatives space.59
ISDA’s most important contribution has been the creation of its
standard form documents.60 The earliest iteration came in the 1985 Swaps
53. Baker, supra note 9, at 1296.
54. John Biggins, ‘Targeted Touchdown' and ‘Partial Liftoff': Post-Crisis Dispute Resolution in the OTC
Derivatives Markets and the Challenge for ISDA, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1297, 1297 (2012).
55. Omarova, supra note 500, at 444.
56. Jackson E. Howell, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 649, 665–66 (2001).
57. See, e.g., Nathaniel G. Dutt, Current United States Credit Default Swap Regulatory Initiatives: A New
World Standard or Just a Ploy?, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 188–89 (2009) (“[T]here is no
international regulatory agency that directly monitors or regulates the CDS market . . . . [T]he true
regulators of the CDS market are the participants themselves.”);; id. at 192 (discussing “ISDA’s selfregulatory system”);; see also Paul Lejot, Cover Up! Hong Kong’s Regulation of Exchange-Traded Warrants¸ 36
H.K. L.J. 277, 279 (2006) (discussing ISDA as the OTC derivatives market’s self-regulatory
organization and its documentation-creating role).
58. See, e.g., G30 PAPER, supra note 28; GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: THE INSIDE STORY OF
J.P. MORGAN AND HOW WALL ST. GREED CORRUPTED ITS BOLD DREAM AND CREATED A
FINANCIAL CATASTROPHE 35 (2010).
59. See, e.g., Serena Ng, Trading Groups Are Agitating over Apparent Leaks on Street, WALL ST. J., Dec.
14, 2006, at C3.
60. See, e.g., Barry Le Vine, Comment: The Derivative Market’s Black Sheep, Regulation of Non-Cleared
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Code, abbreviated from the Code of Standard Wording, Assumption and
Provisions for Swaps.61 Newer versions of the documentation contain
three components: the Master Agreement, where harmony lies and all the
standard terms reside; the Schedule, which modifies the Master Agreement
where choices are to be made; and the Confirmation, which covers the
details of the instant transaction. Other documents are also commonly
appended, such as collateral documents, bridging documents, which
provide for netting across all ISDA documented transactions between the
parties, and other definitions. Though other bodies have offered standard
documents,62 the ISDA Master Agreement is used in more than ninety
percent of OTC derivative transactions.63 These standard documents have
been called a “modern international law merchant.”64 Without these
standard documents, “parties would be plagued by arduous negotiation.”65
ISDA’s process of updating and implementing these documents has
numerous regulatory characteristics. ISDA employs about 3000 people in
its documentation committee,66 which reacts quickly to modify documents — striking and redefining terms — to remain efficient as legal and
economic circumstances change.67 This process also preserves
international harmony of treatment. For example, the 1992 version of the
ISDA Master Agreement provided a thirty-day cure period during which a
debtor might contest involuntary bankruptcy and thereby avoid the
characterization of “default.”68 The 2002 version shortens this period to
fifteen days.69 Some practitioners have criticized this durational shift,
emphasizing that it can take more than fifteen days to even issue a
summons in an involuntary bankruptcy, if only because of a “dilatory
clerk.”70 Yet this shorter rule provides international certainty that is largely
immune from domestic variation in bureaucratic delay.
Security-Based Swaps Under Dodd–Frank, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 699, 710–11 (2011) (noting
“significant operational standardization that has taken place over the past five years, such as
harmonization of default criteria in master ISDA agreements.”).
61. See, e.g., Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 677, 737 (2002).
62. Id. at 740.
63. See, e.g., Henry Knox, Master Artfulness, THE LAWYER (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.thelawyer.com/master-artfulness/1007152.article.
64. Tamar Frankel, Cross-Border Securitization: Without Law, But Not Lawless, 8 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L. L. 255, 275 n.56 (1998).
65. 6 THOMAS J. MOLONEY ET AL., BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL
COURTS § 70:17 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2012); see also Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade
Association: Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 211 (2001).
66. Gelpern, supra note 20, at 65–66.
67. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1144 (2006).
68. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 1992 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, § 5(a)(vii)(4) (1992).
69. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, 2002 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, § 5(a)(vii)(4) (2002).
70. Mark D. Sherrill, Involuntary Bankruptcy and the ISDA Master Agreement: A Square Peg and a Round
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Though scholars have often described the ways in which legislatures will
respond to clear judicial determinations to confirm or override judicial
decisions, we observe little of this dialogue in practice.71 By contrast,
transnational private regulators lead the state sector in harmonizing quasilegislation with an iterative interpretation process. For example, the 2002
version of the ISDA Master Agreement provides in Part (2)(a)(iii) that a
non-defaulting party can withhold payments to a defaulting party during
the period of default, creating a valuable option that permits the nondefaulting party to maintain its claim. The question in the Lomas case was
how long can the non-defaulting party wait.72 Forever? Until the next
payment date?73 Or until the natural end of the transaction?74 ISDA
supported giving the non-defaulting party essentially unlimited time to
revive its claim,75 while some prior decisions had suggested shorter “use it
or lose it” rules. Recent judicial decisions have clarified the clause
consistently with ISDA’s suggestion. But ISDA is contemplating an
amendment to clarify the clause in any case, and perhaps even to
contradict its prior position now that its constituents can evaluate a clear
rule. This illustrates that ISDA is legislative and in dialogue with the courts.
Through the use of protocols, ISDA is able to update contracts on an
ongoing basis.76 Protocols are multilateral contractual amendments, drafted
by ISDA, which then solicits letters of adherence from swap participants.
When all parties to a swap accept the protocol, the protocol becomes
binding on the parties, allowing them to assent contingently to multiple
contract amendments at once.77 This is much the same way as Delaware’s
legislature and courts are able to update the default corporate form from
time to time, retroactively modifying the guiding documents for Delaware
incorporated firms.78 In other words, ISDA is a forum for the provision of
authoritative directives with quasi-precedential force.
ISDA also functions as a sort of adjudicator through the use of its
Credit Determinations Committees.79 Key terms, such as “default” in a
Hole, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2008, at 1, 60 (citing Windbrooke Dev. Corp. v. Envtl. Enters., Inc.
of Fla., 524 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1975)).
71. See David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Process of American Law (Univ. of Ariz. James E.
Rogers
Coll.
of
Law,
Discussion
Paper
No.
13-12,
2013),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2220505.
72. Lomas v. JFB Firth Rixson, Inc., [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch).
73. Marine Trade S.A. v. Pioneer Freight Futures Co. BVI, [2009] EWHC 2656 (Comm).
74. Lomas, [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch).
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Andrew Verstein, Ex Tempore Contracting, § III(B) (Yale Law & Econ., Research Paper
No. 545, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2125169.
http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol77. About
ISDA
Protocols,
ISDA,
management/about-isda-protocols/ (last visited June 2, 2013).
78. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2006).
79. See Verstein, supra note 76; see also Anna Gelpern & G. Mitu Gulati, CDS Zombies (Am. Univ.

2013] PRIVATE REGULATION OF THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET

23

credit default swap (CDS), cannot be described in granular detail ex ante, so
ISDA contracts specify that a Credit Determinations Committee will have
the power to define any such term. Thus, when parties want contractual
clarity, any party can make a request to the appropriate committee to
define the contractual term. In some cases, this amounts to a
determination as to whether the CDS is or is not in default at the present
time. These determinations can be fast, giving parties clarity as to their
entitlements in near real-time. They can then move to seize collateral,
renegotiate, or litigate as need be. Because these determinations are
binding on the contract but not enforceable as judgments, and are based
on general facts about the contract and the market rather than specific
investigations of a party-specific dispute, they are akin to administrative
proceedings rather than outright adjudication. In the absence of speedy,
trustworthy courts for arbitration, the market’s need for timely
determination is met by a non-state actor. Just as norms can be
promulgated by a transnational private regulator, rather than a legislature,
they can be adjudged by a transnational private regulator rather than a
court.
In addition to playing legislative and judicial roles, ISDA materials are
frequently incorporated in state law and regulation. Sometimes, legislative
materials refer to ISDA and its documentation by name, such as when the
New York Insurance Law specifically mentions ISDA documentation in
the definition of a credit default swap.80 Usually, incorporation is not by
name.81 Yet, nameless reference can be equally powerful, such as when the
Bankruptcy Code defines a swap by way of a Master Agreement.82
Incorporation of this ISDA innovation, though without ISDA’s name on
it, is part of how domestic law implements international norms of netting.
And, of course, ISDA’s pervasive role in structuring the shape of the OTC
space — the space that is largely exempt from the Commodity Exchange
Act — is not mentioned in any such statute or rule.83
State reliance on, and reference to, the ISDA regime is consistent with
Cunningham’s analysis of the public implementation of private standards
into law. 84 Cunningham discusses different forms of interaction between
formal state law and private governance norms. He identifies three levels
of state recognition of private norms: (1) when the law merely mentions
Wash. Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 2012-37, 2012).
80. N.Y. INS. LAW § 6901(j)(1) (McKinney 2005); see also id. at (g)(5)(A)(ii) (defining collateral in
terms of ISDA documentation).
81. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169, 186 (2007).
82. 11 U.S.C.A. § 53B(v) (West 2013).
83. See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 81, at 186.
84. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of
Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291 (2005) (creating a typology for different types of private standards
used in law).
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private norms, (2) when the law incorporates private norms into law after
their creation, and (3) when the law formally recognizes a private body as a
state-endorsed standards creator.85 ISDA and the BBA, as will be discussed
below, operate principally at the first two of these levels. Partnoy similarly
analyzes the OTC space: “[O]ne might argue that Congress implemented a
de facto strong standards regime, relying on ISDA, based on ISDA’s
dominance at the time.”86 Partnoy surveys evidence of the strength of
ISDA’s standards and their direct incorporation into law, as well as the law’s
sometimes-silent reliance on those standards.87 As an example of the
former, there are a large number of legal decisions relying on ISDA; as an
example of the latter, globally there are a vast number of statutes and
regulations that reflect provisions of ISDA form contracts, but do not
mention ISDA by name.88
No doubt, some of this incorporation reflects the influence ISDA has
had in shaping state regulation.89 But even ISDA’s influence on state
regulation does not imply a passive, deregulatory state. States can
sometimes stoop to conquer. If ISDA is known to have a harmonizing,
rationalizing agenda, states know that rendering themselves open to ISDA’s
influence will tend to advance harmonized, rational governance. The
passive stance toward ISDA can be an active stance toward the OTC
derivatives market.
By comparison, the BBA’s operation as a private regulator with
international power has gone remarkably unnoticed,90 especially when the
prominence of LIBOR in the last year is taken into account. Nonetheless,
its regulatory role is undeniable. Like ISDA, the BBA’s most important
contribution to the OTC derivatives market is as a harmonizing force
within its sector. ISDA created a viable and harmonized set of terms for
agreements,91 but in the early days of interest-rate swaps, “nonuniformity
was a significant problem” in price as well.92 Difficulty agreeing upon a

85. Id. at 293.
86. Partnoy, supra note 81, at 187.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. G30 REPORT, supra note 28.
90. It is easy to focus on anti-regulatory activity. The BBA’s founding activity was resisting
harmonization at the pan-European level, and, in general, state and inter-state regulation and
harmonization wherever possible. Notebook International: Brussels: Initiative Required, 123 THE BANKER
1421, at 1421 (Dec. 1973) (“harmonization should be limited to as few issues as possible and be
based on the principles of maximum flexibility and self-regulation.”). Yet even as the BBA resisted
governmental harmonization efforts, it worked to rationalize the norms of a disorderly banking
landscape.
91. Interestingly, the BBA drafted the first model swap agreement, which was quickly superseded
by ISDA documentation. See, e.g., Vanatta, supra note 43.
92. Id.
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rate within a given document could be a major sticking point in a
negotiation. As Jeffrey Golden put it:
Market participants fought about everything, even the fallback rate.
That is to say there were pitched battles about what the rate would
be and how it would be determined if it was impossible to find a
reference bank in London that would quote an offered rate for
deposits in the interbank market. Do you go to another market,
and, if so, which one? Do you seek quotations from one, three or
five reference banks in that market?93
There are also large network benefits associated with using a single price
in many transactions. Some of these benefits are the same as with nonprice terms: Common terms make it easier to find a third party willing to
assume one’s responsibilities and more likely that a court will honor those
responsibilities; common terms create liquidity through ease of use and
standardization; and common terms eliminate transaction costs. But price
commands an additional reason for widespread use, because when a price
term is well-known financial actors can generate extensive knowledge
about the rate and its relation to their other options and positions. LIBOR
is sufficiently well-known that financial models predict its motion in
relation to other benchmarks, and parties are likely to have multiple
LIBOR exposures to which they can relate the newly contemplated swap.
They can minimize basis risk with little difficulty, rather than trying to
estimate how a non-LIBOR rate might link with their other exposures.
Like ISDA, the BBA’s role as a transnational regulator has been both
reflected and endorsed through governmental decisions. Indeed, LIBOR’s
ubiquity arose in part through the choices of state agents. Courts have
long adverted to LIBOR in their assessment of damages.94 Many laws
require or prefer the use of a well-known index, and parties who select
LIBOR are essentially granted a safe harbor due to judicial and
administrative preferences.95 For example, the Parity Act allows nonfederally chartered housing creditors to lend with adjustable rates,
provided that they use “a national or regional index,”96 which the Office
93. Jeffrey B. Golden, Setting Standards in the Evolution of Swap Documentation, 13 INT’L FIN. L. REV.
18 (1994). Golden actually refers to “Libor” in the foregoing, but means by it only a generic term for
an interest rate benchmark, not the BBA LIBOR that would come to be synonymous with LIBOR.
94. See, e.g., Rose Hall, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 566 F. Supp. 1558,
1579 (D. Del. 1983) (“In such cases, the rate employed has been the average borrowing rate an
average plaintiff would have had to pay to receive the same amount of money . . . . It follows that the
LIBOR rate, which represents the cost of borrowing US$ (the currency at issue here) should be
utilized in this case.”).
95. Stein v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 279 F. Supp. 2d 286, 290 (taking judicial notice of interest
rates of indexes published in the Wall Street Journal).
96. McCarthy v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 362 F.3d 1008, 1013 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Title VIII of the Garn-St. Germain Depository
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of the Comptroller of the Currency and courts have consistently found
LIBOR to be.97
State actors also use LIBOR in their own transactions. U.S. regulators
used LIBOR as a key rate in making loans to troubled firms during the
financial crisis, such as the Federal Reserve and the Treasury’s bailout loans
to AIG.98 Furthermore, LIBOR is the Department of Commerce’s
preferred rate when engaging in foreign currency transactions.99 This is
consistent with the notion that powerful network effects are often
established (or exacerbated) by public institutions.100 But it also shows the
ways in which powerful private governance exists as an extension of, and
in conversation with, the public regulatory state, such as the way in which
the U.S. government deferred to credit rating agencies and incorporated
them into law.101
Considering its origin as a private institution, it is interesting just how
public a character and outlook the BBA’s LIBOR regulation has assumed.
Prior to the widespread allegations of manipulation in 2007, 2008, and
2011, the BBA initiated major efforts to formalize and professionalize its
governance activities. These efforts are what John Ewan, former director
of LIBOR, called his most important early task at the BBA.102 He set
about formalizing a set of rules for rate calculation, data contribution, and
determination of veracity. The BBA enacted and clarified rules requiring
certification of contributor banks’ processes by their own auditor and risk
management or compliance department. Without legal coercion, the BBA
adopted a set of regulations that aimed at improving veracity.
These safeguards were obviously inadequate. Yet, when news broke
indicating that these efforts may have been insufficient to prevent
manipulation, the BBA initiated a consultative inquiry as to how the
LIBOR rate could be rendered more useful and secure. The 2008
consultation was released in December of that year.103
Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(1)).
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., Mark Gongloff, Tim Geithner Admits Banks Bailed Out with Rigged Libor, Costing Taxpayers
Huge
Amount,
HUFFINGTON
POST
BUS.
(July
25,
2012,
11:06
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-gongloff/timothy-geithner-libor_b_1701904.html.
99. Hornos Electronicos de Venezuela, S.A. v. U.S., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1369 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2003).
100. See DAVID SINGH GREWALL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF
GLOBALIZATION (2009).
101. Concerns of network power will also be especially apt where the value of harmonization to a
market is especially significant, as many have recognized it to be in the OTC derivatives market. We
thus should not neglect the BBA and ISDA’s valuable (and dangerous) achievement in effectively
becoming monopolists over two highly valuable public goods — the transactional structure of OTC
derivative customization and the interest rate reference for short-term loans.
102. Interview with John Ewan, Former Dir. of LIBOR, British Bankers’ Ass’n., in London (June
15, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with John Ewan].
103. See generally FX & MM COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT, LIBOR GOVERNANCE AND SCRUTINY:
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The results of that process were modest changes to the governance
structure. Chairs were created for additional constituencies, such as noncontributor banks in the United States and Europe, the principal options
exchanges in the United States and London, and fund and corporate
borrowers, to help administer the rate. As of January 2010, BBA LIBOR
has also been governed by an independent board.104
These changes appear to have done little to stop subsequent attempts at
manipulation from taking place. Procedures remained lax, chummy,
informal, or ineffective. But this is not to say that there was no regulation.
After all, the light touch approach — governance by stern looks, and the
like — has long characterized English state governance as well.105
It is also interesting that the BBA’s investigation appears to have
considered nearly every option both suggested and implemented by
subsequent state regulators.106 Many of these options were rejected by the
BBA, for reasons we may or may not accept. But they undeniably engaged
in public rulemaking by interviewing the relevant constituencies and
sharing the results of that inquiry and the reasons that guided them.
LIBOR assumed some public functions as the state sector increasingly
withdrew from those functions. For example, until October 1979 the
Federal Reserve took an interest in providing stable interest rates, and
therefore concerned itself with reducing interest rate risk. Under Paul
Volcker’s leadership, the Federal Reserve shifted its focus to combating
inflation in the real economy and allowing the federal funds rate to move
as it might.107 Interest rate volatility increased enormously and the market
had to look away from government regulators for protection and stability.
At the same time, a confluence of forces led to the rise of offshore
interbank dollar funds, or Eurodollar deposits, as a source of financing.108
LIBOR provided banks with just such a tool to reduce volatility. Banks
wishing to make long-term loans could provide LIBOR loans, a variable
PROPOSALS AGREED BY THE FX & MM COMMITTEE (2008), available at
http://www.bbalibor.com/download/4025.
104. Governance, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/governance. Note, however, that the
members of the board are secret.
105. See, e.g., Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1110–11
n.24 (discussing whether U.K. regulation is appropriately described as “light touch”).
106. See discussion infra Part II.A–C.
107. See, e.g., David E. Lindsey et al., The Reform of October 1979: How It Happened and Why, 87 (2,
part 2) FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 187 (2005), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/05/03/part2/Lindsey.pdf.
108. See Hugh S. Piggott, The Historical Development of Syndicated Eurocurrency Loan Agreements, 10
INT’L BUS. L. 199, 199 (1982) (arguing that interest rate caps on time deposits in America and interest
prohibitions on demand deposits made raising funds in America more difficult); Philip R. Wood,
Essay: Sovereign Syndicated Bank Credits in the 1970s, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8 (2010) (noting
that interest-equalization tax discouraged loans outside of the United States, and that oil price hikes
led to dollar outflows into overseas accounts).
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rate loan that moved with their funding costs. Borrowers unwilling to
accept the interest rate risk inherent in the loan could engage in swap
transactions to receive an offsetting payment and pay a fixed rate. The
variable liability could be reassigned to whomever was best able to accept
interest rate risk. Financial engineering with LIBOR-priced loans and
swaps became a source of interest rate stability at precisely the moment
that the Federal Reserve withdrew from the task, allowing banks to lend at
a rate reflecting their true cost of funds. This transition took place with
the tacit approval of regulators.109
The history of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act’s enactment
also suggests that a government can decide to regulate through deploying a
transnational private regulator. Some have gone as far as to suggest that
ISDA basically drafted the CFMA — the legislation that created almost
two decades of de facto exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of the OTC
derivatives market for ISDA. As one author put it, Senators Lugar and
Gramm “quietly inserted this 262-page bill (written by the ISDA) into a
$384 billion, 11,000-page omnibus budget bill.”110 Indeed, the role of
ISDA may have been even stronger.
ISDA lobbied successfully for enactment of the U.S. Commodity
Futures Modernization Act in 2000, which exempted OTC derivatives
from regulation by the federal agency that supervises futures and
commodities exchanges. ISDA’s skill in promoting standardization in swap
market practice, documentation, and settlement was important in this
decision, and effectively ended pressure for direct regulation of OTC
derivative products, both in the United States and elsewhere.111
Frank Partnoy draws something like the same causal connection in the
context of ISDA’s important role as a standards-setting organization.112 As
he puts it, “one might argue that Congress implemented a de facto strong
standards regime, relying on ISDA, based on ISDA's dominance at the
time. Judicial reliance on ISDA standards would support such a strong

109. Hillbrandt, ICI’s finance director, asserts that the Bank of England was briefed on the use of
swaps to facilitate the Eurodollar market and was “favorably inclined to the use of swap
arrangements of this type.” Raphael Hodgson, The Birth of the Swap, 65 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 32, 34
(2009).
110. Mark Labaton, Swap Meet: An Understanding of the Development of Credit Default Swaps Can Point
the Way to Real Financial Industry Regulatory Reform, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Oct. 2009, at 24, 28,
available at http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/Vol32No7/2637.pdf.
111. Lejot, supra note 57, at 292–93 (“ISDA lobbied successfully for enactment of the US
Commodity Futures Modernization Act in 2000, which exempted OTC derivatives from regulation
by the federal agency that supervises futures and commodities exchanges. ISDA’s skill in promoting
standardisation in swap market practice, documentation and settlement was important in this
decision, and effectively ended pressure for direct regulation of OTC derivative products, both in the
United States and elsewhere.”).
112. See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 81, at 187.
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interpretation. More than eighty published cases have relied on ISDA in
reaching decisions.”113
The foregoing is not an argument that ISDA or the BBA have been
consistently excellent regulators. Numerous complaints can be made, from
the manipulation of LIBOR to the backlog in derivatives confirmations.114
Though it can be rational for states to outsource regulation, the recipients
of that power may be venal or inept; but they are still regulators. The next
Part considers the implications of characterizing the OTC market as
having been subject to private regulation.

II.
A.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION OF
THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET
Moderating Reactive Regulation

There is a well-documented process by which laws are written in great
number and length in the wake of regulatory failure and crisis, and these
laws may be unduly punitive, rushed, or otherwise problematic.115 This
phenomenon seems to be especially prevalent in the financial space.116
This is not just a pathology of lawmaking; once the deregulated status
quo is accepted, new regulation stems from common sense. A new sweep
of regulation may bring unanticipated problems, but who will decline the
offer of “regulation” when the discredited alternative is “no regulation”?
Recognizing that the status quo was regulated may hold some promise
of tempering this cycle. The regulation was insufficient, co-opted, corrupt,
or mistaken, so reform is required. However, the resultant reform is from
regulation to regulation, regulator to regulator, which necessarily involves a
more sophisticated approach. Consider, in comparison, the criticism of
thrift regulation under the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).
113. Id.
114. See Baker, supra note 9, at 1315; see also Siona Robin Listokin, MetaRegulation of OTC Derivatives
Contracts Post Reform (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499964 (discussing industry’s failure to address confirmation backlog).
115. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
(2012); STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND
POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690–1860 257 (1998); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOU. L. REV. 77, 79
(2003); Mark J. Roe, Washington and Delaware as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 7 (2009);
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J.
1521, 1591–94 (2005).
116. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial
Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 39, 74–
89 (2009). For example, Bainbridge noted of our intellectual property proposal that “even if it had
merit as a stand-alone reform, Rauterberg and Verstein’s proposal surely was unrealistic in terms of
practical politics.” Stephen Bainbridge, Reforming Libor: Wheatley Versus the Alternatives, 45–50 (UCLA
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 13-02) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2209970.
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Washington Mutual, AIG, Countrywide Financial and other prominent
financial institutions held charters as thrifts, regulated by the OTS.117
These institutions performed poorly during the financial crisis, having
been allowed to binge on risky mortgage-backed instruments, swaps, and
subprime assets.118 The OTS was savagely criticized and then disbanded —
the nuclear option in administrative discipline. We did not act, however, as
though thrifts were roaming brigands, free from all regulation. We knew
that they were regulated, but badly, and so we set about integrating them
into a regulatory regime that made more sense.
If the problematic past had zero regulation, then it makes sense to think
that any non-zero amount of regulation is likely to be an improvement.
However, if the past was regulated, then any change is a change in
regulation rather than an initiation of regulation. Proposals must be
justified as superior to existing regulation rather than simply superior to no
regulation. Substantively, this framing is likely to lead to more nuanced and
moderate regulatory responses.
What would this more nuanced approach to regulatory reform look
like? LIBOR’s failure has prompted numerous reform proposals, some of
which have been adopted, and some of which may yet be. It is nonsense to
act as though these proposals are against a blank slate when most of these
proposals were explicitly considered by the BBA. Even if that body has
been discredited, it bears considering the arguments that might have
justified resisting the proposals previously.
The Wheatley Review is a blue ribbon report prepared by Martin
Wheatley, the CEO designate of the United Kingdom’s soon-to-be new
financial regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The FCA will
have control over most non-stability related financial regulation.119
Wheatley’s September 2012 report made a series of proposals,120 which the
U.K. government has endorsed in full and has already begun to
implement.121 The recommendations suggest increased public oversight of
the index (LIBOR), including substantive requirements for how the index
must be created, and increased penalties for malfeasance.
Fascinatingly, almost all of the 2012 Wheatley reforms were considered
by the BBA in its 2008 consultative paper. Many were rejected, often for
reasons acknowledged by Wheatley in his reports. As regulators consider
117. See Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: The Office of Thrift Supervision’s
Performance During the Financial Crisis, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1777, 1779 n.5 (2011).
118. See id. at 1777 (evaluating relative performance of thrifts).
119. See, e.g., Sam Robinson, The Financial Conduct Authority — Its Role in the New UK Regulatory
Framework, BLOOMBERG LAW, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/thefinancial-conduct-authority/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
120. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44.
121. See, e.g., HM TREASURY, WRITTEN MINISTERIAL STATEMENT 2 (2012), available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/wms_fst_171012.pdf.
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moving forward, they should take stock of the evaluation of their
regulatory predecessor.
The BBA also considered changes to the index that might better serve
the public, but declined to do so for avowedly public interest reasons. If
taken at its word, the BBA’s inaction was a deliberate regulatory decision.
At a minimum, the BBA showed sophistication about what others would
take to be its responsibility. Taking stock of the BBA report, the lesson is
that with any reform effort, the reforms necessarily involve trade-offs that
prior BBA regulatory consultations highlighted.122 We will provide
numerous examples of this later. For now, at least three trade-offs are
notable in discussing any improvement of LIBOR:
(1) Reform versus stability (or, the “grandfathering problem”): Any proposal that
makes important changes to the index will upset market expectations for
those who began using the index prior to reform. Many market
participants may prefer the devil that they know. Others may be concerned
about distributional effects of even efficient improvements in LIBOR. If
an improved LIBOR skews higher as a result, it will disadvantage the payor
on a LIBOR instrument. Finally, substantial changes to the rate could
result in legal challenges to the validity of linked instruments.
(2) Transparency versus opacity: It is easy to be upset about the lack of
transparency in LIBOR, which allows bad behavior to go unnoticed or
unverified. However, opacity has its virtues since reputational manipulation
of LIBOR was a direct result of banks’ fears that true but embarrassing
submissions would be revealed to the public. Likewise, rules and data make
it easier for third parties to game the system by engaging in transactions
pitched to the rules.
(3) Public accountability versus optimal incentives: Government ownership of
an index, stipulation of rules, or harsh punishment for index wrongdoers
may increase a sense of public oversight. However, the government may
lack incentive and the knowledge to craft an index correctly, and harsh
rules and penalties may drive participants away from contributing to the
index.
An improvement to one aspect of the indexing processes necessarily
increases risks in another. The rest of this subpart examines the reforms
recommended by the Wheatley Review, the reforms implemented by
settlements with three banks, and reforms suggested but not yet
implemented. For each, understanding the trade-offs involved in regulatory
change helps sensitize us to the costs of any particular proposal.

122. Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40.
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Fewer LIBORs

The Wheatley Review proposes that LIBOR will be quoted in fewer
tenors and currencies. As it stands, LIBOR is quoted in ten currencies and
at fifteen different borrowing durations. Some of these are based on
markets with substantial volume, such as the overnight USD rate. Some
are extensively used by third parties, such as the three-month USD rate,
which is among the most important for U.S. subprime mortgage pricing.123
Yet, some are little used by third parties,124 and based on very few
underlying transactions, such as the eleven-month Swedish Krona.125
Recognizing the potential to manipulate such a thinly-traded market,
Wheatley recommends eliminating 130 of the 150 LIBOR rates.126
The BBA considered eliminating tenors as well, but declined to do so.
While the Wheatley review asserts that the cost of eliminating lesser tenors
is low, the BBA considered them significant. As John Ewan said, “Should
we stop doing these? Somewhere, someone is doing a product that links to
the unlikely rate.”127 Without knowing who was using the unlikely rate and
why they deemed it better than a market favorite, the BBA was unwilling
to act. The BBA recently published a consultative report surveying various
market participants as to their feelings on eliminating such little-used
tenors. This report confirmed Wheatley’s sense that many LIBORs were
not favorites of the market, but also confirmed Ewan’s sense that there
remain devoted users of these benchmarks who will be the losers in any
elimination plan.128 For example, a majority of respondents agreed that the
BBA could eliminate its little used tenors, as well as the Australian Dollar,
New Zealand Dollar, Canadian Dollar, Danish Krone, and Swedish Krona
fixing. Nevertheless, for each of these, between nine percent and twentynine percent of the respondents opposed discontinuing the rate. There
appears to be a significant group of users that finds these rates to be at
least sometimes useful.129
Here, as with elsewhere, the BBA appears to have taken grandfathering
concerns seriously. Again, recent market surveys substantiate the BBA’s
caution. More than half of the market participants surveyed expressed
123. Fifty-nine percent of USD-denominated swaps and floating rate notes that cite LIBOR
utilize the three-month tenor. See, e.g., THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, at 36 tbl. 5.A.
124. Essentially zero percent of interest rate swaps and floating rate notes quote the one-, three-,
six-, or twelve-month Swedish Krona. Id.
125. Less than seven of the LIBOR banks engaged in Swedish Krona borrowing in any
substantial quantity, and none did so at the eleven-month maturity. Id. at 30 tbl. 4.A.
126. Id. ¶¶ 5.9–5.10.
127. Interview with John Ewan, supra note 102.
128. BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, STRENGTHENING LIBOR — PROPOSAL TO IMPLEMENT
RECOMMENDATION NUMBER 6 OF THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR — SUMMARY OF
FEEDBACK RECEIVED (2013), available at http://www.bbalibor.com/download/8739.
129. Id. at 3–5.
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concern about rapid removal of lightly-traded tenors, and substantial
minorities expressed concern about removal of such tenors and currencies
even within the longer time horizon suggested by Wheatley.130
Wheatley’s response acknowledged that eliminating tenors would
decrease cross-tenor corroboration.131 Likewise, there was reported
concern “about the impact on those contracts that reference these rates
and the associated market disruption, suggesting a cautious approach in
this respect and that, in each case, an appropriate consultation with the
relevant domestic authorities should be undertaken to ensure minimal
disruption.”132

2.

Quote Anonymity

Wheatley also proposes that LIBOR-rate contributions be unavailable
to the public for three months. The thought is that this will allow
contributor banks to more honestly represent their cost of borrowing,
since they need not fear that high costs will be immediately reported to the
market and interpreted as a sign of weakness.133 It may also make it more
difficult for a cartel to enforce an agreement to manipulate the rate, since a
breach of the agreement would remain invisible for some time.134
Additionally, would-be manipulators could not so easily predict the effect
of their quote upon the overall field,135 since they could not observe how
close the rate was to being rounded up or down.136
Once again, looking at the BBA provides insight into the trade-offs of
this regulation. The BBA considered such a proposal and declined after
consultation with its constituents. Sixty-one percent of respondents told
the BBA that the existing level of anonymity was best, and only fifteen
percent wished an increase in opacity of rates.137 Wheatley’s compromise
between transparency and opacity, a period of delay before data are
released, was endorsed by exactly two of the BBA respondents.138 Market
130. Id.
131. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, app. ¶ B.13.
132. Id. app. ¶ B.12.
133. Id. ¶ 5.15 (“Real-time publication of submissions can create incentives to submit a lower rate
than would otherwise have been submitted.”).
134. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 32. This hardly seems significant since cartel
members could voluntarily show their participation through any number of means.
135. See, e.g., THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, ¶ 5.15.
136. However, given the ease with which contributors, traders, and voice brokers communicated,
it would seem that this reform will have little effect unless other dynamics are substantially changed.
137. BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, BBA LIBOR CONSULTATION, supra note 47, ¶ 1.14 (“Many
respondents, and particularly those of the contributing banks, considered that a decrease in the
current level of transparency would not necessarily be interpreted as positive move.”). This is
consistent with the information gathered by the Wheatley Review. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra
note 44.
138. See, e.g., BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, BBA LIBOR CONSULTATION, supra note 47, § 3.18.
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participants were concerned that a lack of transparency on submissions
could further cast a shadow over the rate, as participants could not readily
compare submission data to comparable metrics. Many of the important
studies identifying LIBOR manipulation relied on bank-level data to
determine where banks’ self-evaluation of creditworthiness did not match
the market.
B.

The Settlements

Not only are new regulations emerging from explicit, legislative reforms
in the United States and United Kingdom, but enforcement and action
through the judicial system are making an equally important impact. The
recent internationally-coordinated settlements between state regulators and
LIBOR panel banks illustrate how settlements can function as regulation.
Furthermore, they underscore the interaction of domestic governmental
regulators (operating through both enforcement and legislation) and
transnational private regulators in regulating aspects of the OTC
derivatives market.
In June 2012, Barclays PLC settled Commodity Exchange Act violations
with the CFTC. Barclays’ settlement involved numerous non-financial
terms. It agreed to substantive provisions for how it will contribute to
benchmark rates. Within six months of the Barclays order in December
2012, UBS similarly settled claims with the CFTC and Britain’s market
conduct regulator on essentially the same terms.139
The settlement provides directives for how Barclays must calculate its
LIBOR quote submissions. Barclays must give its own transactions the
greatest weight in determining submissions,140 though it may modify that
data with subjective assessments of market and counterparty conditions.141
The settlement also extensively specifies the oversight and governance
structures within the firm.142 Firewalls, both bureaucratic and geographic,

139. UBS AG & UBS Sec. Japan Co., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,481 (Dec. 19, 2012),
available
at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfub
sorder121912.pdf (order instituting proceedings pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity
Exchange Act making findings and imposing remedial sanctions).
140. Barclays PLC, No. 12-25, at 32 (C.F.T.C. June 27, 2012), available at
http://cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfbarclays
order062712.pdf (noting that submissions may include overnight index swaps, currency futures,
repos, futures, Fed Funds and other factors).
141. Id. at 33 (noting that other factors may include time, market events, term structure, credit
standards, counterparty conditions and baselines).
142. Id. at 34 (requiring the daily submissions to be reviewed every day by a supervisor
experienced in the market and prohibiting supervisors and submitters from having compensation
linked to derivatives trading or being derivatives traders); id. at 39 (requiring compliance personnel to
physically visit trading floors at least monthly).
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are to be established.143 Extensive records are to be kept144 — even of
factors that are notoriously intangible145 — and the data must be coded
along eighteen axes.146 Regular disclosures to regulators are required,147 as
are audits.148 The settlement even includes public advocacy
requirements.149
It is fair to say that these settlement-imposed changes to the rate-setting
process are far more extensive than those proposed by the Wheatley
Review. Settlements for past wrongdoing entail an avenue for substantial
public oversight and substantive prescription of business conduct. This is
regulation by settlement, and it comes as a replacement to a governance
regime that was deemed to be inadequate, but which contemplated many
of these prescriptions.
The BBA declined to provide extensive ex ante guidance as to how
banks must produce their submissions and to put “twenty minions at each
bank to make sure they are flying straight.”150 They deemed themselves
comparatively less well-equipped than banks to tell each bank how best to
craft its own compliance and risk management,151 and to draft extensive
rules that would apply in various and future cases. Instead, the BBA
required banks to have their own compliance and auditing services certify
their submissions. The BBA also deemed it appropriate to offer only
minimal guidance, such as that the cash dealer and not the swap trader
must submit the quotes. Likewise, the BBA played a role in clarifying the
143. Id. at 34–35.
144. Id. at 37 (requiring that essentially all communication about the index be preserved, with
preservation time depending on the media format and location of the individuals); id. at 37 (requiring
trades and positions, and those of other traders dealing with these markets, to be recorded and kept);
id. at 36 (requiring supervisor identity be recorded and kept for five years); id. at 35 (requiring the
preservation of all models and methods included in submissions); id. at 35 (requiring the preservation
of all voice broker offers and information, including identification (company, person, etc.) of specific
offers upon which submission is based).
145. Id. at 35–36 (requiring the preservation of the definition of “reasonable market size” used in
the submission); id. at 36 (requiring that submissions note which specify market announcements or
effects entered into their assessment and what effects those events were deemed to have had); id. at
35 (requiring Barclays to keep a record of each submission for five years, including the factors that
influenced the submission and their relative weight, and a list of the transactions deemed nonrepresentative and therefore not included).
146. Id. at 36 (requiring transactional data to note, inter alia, customer number, interest basis
(360/365-day year) and maturity date).
147. Id. at 40 (requiring Barclays to make an interim report to the CFTC about its progress every
four months); id. at 41 (requiring the immediate report of any attempted manipulation or improper
conduct to the CFTC); id. at 35 (requiring that all of these records be available to the CFTC at any
time, without subpoena).
148. Id. at 38 (requiring an internal audit every six months, including random sample of
submissions and evidence); id. at 35 (requiring a third-party audit annually).
149. Id. at 42 (requiring Barclays to advocate for the index provider to signal whether rates are
based on actual transactions).
150. Interview with John Ewan, supra note 102.
151. Id.

36

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 54:1

rules whenever changing circumstances made clarification useful, such as
whether a government-supported loan’s cost should count when a bank
calculated its cost of funds. Ongoing, particularized advice was considered
to be more fruitful than extensive upfront rules.
This evaluation was not just based on institutional competence. The
BBA’s consultation with its constituents led it to think that greater ex ante
specificity in processes was not to be desired. For example, the settlements
provide extensive guidance on the content of the submission, requiring the
submitting bank to define “reasonable” market size clearly. By contrast, the
BBA’s report found that seventy-seven percent of the thirty-one formal
responses opposed requiring a fixed and clear account of market size,
while only one thought that formalizing the question would be helpful.152
The Wheatley Review came to the same conclusion, declining to stipulate
what question LIBOR is set to answer, or how precisely firms must do
so.153 While the settlements are intended to improve LIBOR, they require
policies that were rejected by the Wheatley Review and the BBA. A
measured approach is therefore appropriate, especially when the method
of applying these requirements is an ad hoc process of unilateral
settlements.154
C.

Other Reform Proposals

Transaction-Based Index. Many experts have argued that LIBOR should be
replaced by an index that is based only on genuine transaction data, which
would be public or publishable if necessary. The Wheatley Review
declined to make this recommendation in part because most market
participants responding to Wheatley said this was not feasible.155 The BBA
came to the same conclusion.156
Eliminate LIBOR. Professor Michael Barr, former Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Financial Institutions, has said that LIBOR is unnecessary
in good markets and untrustworthy in bad markets.157 He has urged
regulators to push for the transition to a new index. Yet, the Wheatley
152. See, e.g., BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, BBA LIBOR CONSULTATION, supra note 47.
153. See, e.g., THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, ¶ 2.14.
154. See generally Rebecca Tabb & Joseph Grundfest, Alternatives to Libor (Rock Ctr. for Corporate
Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 138, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2272462.
155. See, e.g., THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, app. ¶ B.19. Those few participants who
supported it did so with designs for a regulatory subsidy addressing the dearth of transactions. Id.
app. ¶ B.20 (“for example, by creating special considerations for the inter-bank market, similar to
market-maker exemptions (e.g. capital relief, more relaxed liquidity rules, etc.)”).
156. See, e.g., BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, BBA LIBOR CONSULTATION, supra note 47, at 4 (stating
that an element of judgment will always be required).
157. See, e.g., Michael Barr, It’s Time to Take the ‘E’ Out of “LIE-BOR,” YAHOO! FIN. (Oct. 17,
2012,
7:46
PM),
http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/the-exchange/barr-time-e-lie-bor234646443.html#more-id.
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Review concluded that transition to a new index “would pose an
unacceptably high risk of significant financial instability, and risk largescale litigation . . . .”158 Similar concerns have been expressed by Ben
Bernanke159 and industry representatives.160
Any change to LIBOR’s fundamental operations could create
uncertainty and litigation costs, as some parties may seek to invadidate
their contracts. These risks are especially high if the new LIBOR generally
disadvantages some constituency. While appropriate chain and transition
rules could prevent an abrupt change in the rate, a clumsy transition to a
new methodology would result in systematically higher or lower rates, with
greater or lesser volatility.161 With so many contracts linked to LIBOR —
subprime mortgages in Alabama, bond issues by the city of Baltimore,
Eurodollar futures contracts traded in Chicago, syndicated loans for
infrastructure projects in Pakistan, and interest rate swaps between
multinational conglomerates — it is impossible to predict how a new
LIBOR could affect all of its users.
Abrupt or not, some participants want relatively little change to LIBOR.
They like it for its correlation to bank borrowing costs, and prefer it to
other rates.162 Market participants have not voted with their feet, even
though there are other rates available. Despite all of the negative publicity,
there is no indication of a decline in LIBOR use.163
Government-run LIBOR. Some experts have urged government provision
of the LIBOR benchmark or its replacement index.164 It is thought that “a
158. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, ¶ 1.12. See also id. app. ¶ B.34 (“Most responses
recommended caution with regards to making significant changes to LIBOR, in case it puts existing
transactions at risk . . . . There was also a concern that step changes in the rate as a consequence of
changes to LIBOR may pose legal difficulties.”).
159. See, e.g., Shahien Nasiripour, US Regulator Calls for Faster Libor Reform, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 24,
2012,
7:33
PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e617878a-065b-11e2-abdb00144feabdc0.html#axzz2bOmmDR00 (“‘The problem is that, of course, we have enormous
amounts of existing contracts, not just derivatives contracts, but a variety of other kinds of loans and
securities which are based on [LIBOR],’ Mr. Bernanke said. ‘And until those are negotiated away or
they expire, we have this huge legacy issue of [LIBOR]-based financial contracts.’”).
160. See, e.g., Brook Masters, Fast Libor Reform ‘Risks Causing Chaos,’ FIN. TIMES, (Sept. 10, 2012,
7:37
PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b805fa0a-fb40-11e1-a98300144feabdc0.html#axzz2U2WSsWYw (citing corporate borrower group and investment
management associations’ concerns).
161. See Sarah Lewis, 150 Shades of Libor, FOCUS (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.trinityllp.com/150shades-of-libor/ (arguing that reformed LIBOR could lead to higher, more volatile, rates).
162. See, e.g., Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & David S. Evans, Will the Wheatley Recommendations Fix LIBOR?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, Nov. 2012, at 3 (noting that “market participants . . . presumably have believed that LIBOR was conceptually the best rate to rely on and that it was superior to
other readily available benchmarks”);; see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 40–41 (noting problems
with other indices); Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40, at 49.
163. See, e.g., The WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, ¶ 1.13.
164. Id. app. ¶ B.31. Some of the responses to the Wheatley Review’s initial discussion paper
argued “that the authorities should take ownership of the rate, including rate-setting . . . .” Id.
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government benchmark would not be vulnerable to the sort of
manipulation to which LIBOR has been subjected.”165 Yet government
manipulation of indices is also possible.166 Indeed, some of the LIBOR
manipulation that occurred is alleged to have been at the behest of
government officials concerned about policy objectives.167 The basis risk
would be higher for a government-run index unless it was based on the
same borrowing rates of the current LIBOR,168 in which case it would face
the same problems of insufficient data in thin markets as does LIBOR. In
any case, parties already have the option to use a government rate if they
wish, so it seems unlikely that eliminating a prominent non-governmental
option would assist parties. At the same time, the Wheatley Review worries
that a publicly-run LIBOR would not adapt to user needs as quickly as
does a privately-provided benchmark.169 Wheatley therefore recommended
against government control of the index.170
D.

Regulatory Pathologies

Closer scrutiny of the record of LIBOR and the BBA during its period
of putative “deregulation” provides other important lessons for future
reform. One lesson involves the ways in which public regulators can be
captured or otherwise rendered powerless. Unsettling evidence has
suggested that regulators may have known, tacitly approved, or even
recommended manipulation of LIBOR to panel banks.
Some amount of LIBOR manipulation may have been with the blessing
of state regulators. Bob Diamond testified that senior British officials had
raised concerns that Barclays’ rates were too high and that it would be
better to lower them.171 In other correspondence, it was suggested that
Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, may have been
among the regulators blessing the depressed rate. Diamond carried the
message to his subordinates. Jerry Del Missier gave the instruction,
believing that he was following indirect orders from the Bank of England.
As The Economist put it, there is “evidence that can be interpreted as an
implicit nod from the Bank of England (and Whitehall mandarins)” to
engage in manipulation “to bolster confidence in banks and keep credit
165. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 39.
166. See, e.g., Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40, at 135–40.
167. See discussion infra Part II.D.
168. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 38.
169. See, e.g., THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 44, ¶ 3.7.
170. Id. ¶ 1.16.
171. See, e.g., James Chapman & Becky Barrow, Revenge of a Fallen Titan: Ousted Barclays Boss Makes
Damning Claims Bank of England and Labour Ministers Were Involved in Rigging Interest Rates, DAILY MAIL
ONLINE (last updated July 4, 2012, 6:59 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2168449/Bob-Diamond-resignation-Ousted-Barclays-boss-makes-damning-claims-Bank-EnglandLabour-ministers-involved-rigging-rates.html.
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flowing.”172 The manipulating banks thus may have had “tacit permission
from their regulators.”173 The impulse behind potential regulatory cooperation in rate manipulation might be understandable as the health of domestic financial institutions during the financial crisis became intertwined with
the survival of the real economy.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York was informed — perhaps in
April 2008,174 perhaps in August of 2007175 — that Barclays was
underestimating its rates. This resulted in a June 2008 email to Merwyn
King, Governor of the Bank of England, from U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury Tim Geithner. The ten-point recommendations included in the
email were essentially copied from the BBA’s own proposal, meaning that
the government’s only regulatory response was to adopt a regulation from
industry. Those proposals ended up being forwarded back to the BBA.176
That proposal went nowhere, with U.K. officials denying that they had
even received such notice.177
These disturbing possibilities of regulatory involvement in the provision
of inaccurate borrowing quotes for LIBOR suggest that in order to be
effective, future public regulation of LIBOR may need to be cordoned off
from political interests. This underscores the importance of recognizing
the risks of public index provision.178 Viewing the BBA as a regulator also
allows one to see it as a captured regulator, entirely too tolerant of the
banks it supervised. This, again, reminds us of the importance and
difficulty of protecting public regulators from industry capture.
Regulators of all stripes make mistakes, and our attention must be
focused on how to help them make better decisions. Jon Macey opined
that “regulators foolishly looked to [LIBOR] to determine the market’s
perception of the health of big banks.”179 Will they make the same mistake
172. How Britain’s Rate-Fixing Scandal Might Spread — And What to Do About It, ECONOMIST (July
7, 2012), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21558260.
173. Id.
174. Libor Talks Go Back to Early ’08, WALL ST. J. (last updated July 14, 2012, 3:06 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303919504577524510853665528.html.
175. See, e.g., Rachelle Younglai & Pedro da Costa, Geithner Says Did All He Could to Address Libor
Problem, CHI. TRIB. (July 26, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-26/news/sns-rt-ususa-geithnerbre86o0vc-20120725_1_libor-responsibility-for-market-manipulation-british-bankersassociation.
176. Forwarded e-mail from Mervyn King to Timothy Geithner (June 3, 2008, 9:21 AM), available
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2012/libor/June_3_2008_email_from_Me
rvyn_King.pdf.
177. See, e.g., Mark Scott, Bank of England Chief Denies New York Fed Gave Warning on Rate-Rigging,
N.Y.
TIMES
DEALBOOK
(last
updated
July
17,
2012,
8:05
AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/17/bank-of-england-chief-denies-n-y-fed-gave-warning-onrate-rigging/?scp=2&sq=bank%20of%20england&st=Search.
178. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40.
179. Jonathan Macey, Libor: Three Scandals in One, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July 20, 2012), available at
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if given greater control over this space? Will more frequent meetings and
more formalistic procedures increase unjustified confidence? AbrantesMetz and Sokol argue that the LIBOR manipulation was easy to detect:
“Had any member bank that set [LIBOR] or any antitrust authority
undertaken an econometric screen, they likely would have detected these
anomalies . . . .”180 What causes regulators to decline to use these screens,
just as the BBA and its members did, if they can be so effective?
E.

The Limits of Private Regulation

Private regulation failed in the OTC space because of steps private
regulators chose not to take. However, among those omissions were
actions that the private regulators could not have effectuated. While a private
regulator can create advantageous circumstances for those who conform
to best practices or standardized ways of doing business, such a regulator
may have difficulty preventing free-riders from taking advantage of the
system to which others contribute. For instance, a transnational private
regulator will have little ability to create and enforce intellectual property
regimes.
For example, the LIBOR banks incur significant costs to contribute to
the rate. Other banks and entities enjoy the use of a widely-known rate,
but they may not end up paying for it. A private regulator has only limited
powers of exclusion over information. ISDA, for example, provides that
its agreements are valid only when printed on paper purchased from
ISDA. Whether this self-destruction language actually proves effective,
ISDA has found a cumbersome way at least to imply that unauthorized
users do not enjoy full benefits.
The BBA can delay access to LIBOR data, but cannot effectively
exclude non-paying users given the state of intellectual property in many
nations. Without the ability to internalize much of its users’ gains,
incentives are skewed for actors subject primarily to transnational private
regulators.181 Sometimes the solution may be to allow the transnational
private regulators some limited power over the provision of intellectual
property. More often, state actors must focus on those regulatory powers
that they are unwilling to delegate to the private regulator.
Further, the LIBOR incident may be “too big to litigate,” because even
the panel banks — many of the world’s largest and most important
financial institutions — may not have pockets deep enough to actually
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137789/jonathan-macey/libor-three-scandals-in-one.
180. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & D. Daniel Sokol, The Lessons from Libor for Detection and Deterrence of
Cartel Wrongdoings, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 11 (2012), http://www.hblr.org/2012/10/thelessons-from-libor-for-detection-and-deterrence-of-cartel-wrongdoing/.
181. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40.
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compensate victims for the sums of money that inappropriately changed
hands if misleading submissions dramatically altered the LIBOR rates. The
structure of “too big to litigate” exists within the OTC derivatives market,
at least in part because the central private regulators — ISDA and the
BBA — produce valuable intellectual property that structures market
transactions (through documentation and reference rates, respectively) as
something like public goods. As a result, neither of these organizations,
nor the major commercial entities that inform their output, fully
internalize anything like the profit stream that their intellectual property
could make available. A difficulty results: the production of intellectual
property as a public service means that there may not be sufficient funds
available to hold culprits accountable if misuse occurs.182
Besides the odd problem of the world’s biggest banks potentially being
judgment-proof because LIBOR was largely provided for free, this
combination of private regulatory production of public goods has its own
particular hazards.
All of the products offered by ISDA — its ubiquitous documentation,
legislative efforts, or Credit Derivatives Committees — are produced
through a particular kind of information production, which we have called
byproduction elsewhere.183 Information is byproduced when it is produced
as an incident to some other profit-generating activity.184 For instance, the
New York Mercantile Exchange creates the NYMEX financial index and
the financial participants on ISDA’s influential committees draft ISDA’s
documentation, but neither corporate entity’s principal motivation is the
production of that information.185 Rather, derivatives markets participants

182. These structural features of ISDA documentation and LIBOR are discussed in far greater
detail elsewhere. See Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40. Stephen Bainbridge has addressed the
analysis of intellectual property and incentives therein with some subtlety, but also with several
errors. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 45–50. For instance, Bainbridge misses that producers of
financial intellectual property will need property protection from wherever their fees principally
accrue. Bainbridge also fails to recognize that the value of the intellectual property of LIBOR and
ISDA documentation could quickly grow stale and useless in the absence of adequate incentives.
Unlike a static piece of intellectual property, such as a book or patent, most financial intellectual
property is iteratively produced and dynamic, and outdated information can be worse than useless.
That intellectual property reform should be supplemented by other reforms — in the LIBOR context
or elsewhere — is something that we never deny.
183. See, e.g., Rauterberg & Verstein, supra note 40, at 135–40.
184. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law as a ByProduct: Theories of Private Law
Production (Ill. Law, Behavior & Soc. Sci. Research, Research Paper No. LBSS11-27, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884985 (distinguishing production and byproduction); Bruce H.
Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Private Lawdrafting, Intellectual Property, and Public Laws (George Mason
Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 13-20, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986455.
185. See, e.g., N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 118 (2d
Cir. 2007) (discussing incidental production of information by NYMEX).

42

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 54:1

serve on ISDA’s committees in order to assist in creating the financial
infrastructure that enables efficient transacting.
Byproduction has two features that promote the likelihood of
byproducts serving as public goods. The first is conceptual: a byproduct is
not designed by its creators as a principal profit-making instrument. The
second is its corollary: because a byproduct is an incident to some otherdirected commercial activity, it is typically low-cost to its producers. For
both of these reasons, byproducts will often be provided to third parties as
a public good.
Related to these benefits, however, are several structural features of
byproduction that make it especially prone to certain regulatory failures.
Byproducts often employ private internal firm data (hence, their status as
byproducts), making misuse or manipulation of that data more difficult to
detect. Byproducts are, by definition, not a primary firm income generator,
and sometimes will not be significant income producers at all. If so, then
the incentive to maintain the byproduct’s quality and reputation — an
incentive that can dilute manipulative impulses — will be absent. Finally,
and most importantly, like any form of joint production,186 byproducts are
generated alongside some other product, and creators may have a conflict
of interest if the byproduct can impact the primary product’s success.
Byproduction of harmonized regulation can often be an efficient way
for markets to be governed, and private regulators can often produce it
efficiently. However, this mode suffers from structural limitations, both in
terms of incentives and powers. While awareness of private regulation can
often relieve the state of regulatory burdens, the state’s interventions may
be doubly important where private regulation is unlikely to work well.
F.

Assessing the Desirability of Regulatory Abdication

LIBOR manipulation may have created an inefficient distribution of
wealth during the period of improper quote provision.187 Beyond simply
wreaking havoc in the absence of regulation, an unregulated LIBOR may
have also frustrated government regulation intended to improve the
economy in the early days of the Great Recession. In December 2007, the
Bank of England cut the base rate fifty basis points to 5.5%. LIBOR fell
by only four basis points. As the senior technical manager of one of
England’s largest mortgage brokers put it, “The rate cut has not had the
usual reaction in the market.”188 One possible explanation for the
unresponsiveness could be that monetary policy efforts — intended to
186. See generally M. Ishaq Nadiri, Joint Production, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 1028 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
187. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 9.
188. Tanya Powley, Libor Stays High Despite Rate Cut, MONEY MKTG., Dec. 13, 2007, at 5.
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lower rates to borrowers, improve liquidity, and stimulate the economy —
were undermined by false submissions.
Yet, willful unresponsiveness to policy levers implies that the BBA or
LIBOR banks had the power to use LIBOR to affect monetary policy by
contributing to perceptions of the direction of short-term interest rates,
the target of the Bank of England’s policy move. This is consistent with
the prior discussion that the state may have delegated some amount of
control over interest rates to the BBA.189 It may be that LIBOR, in taking
on a monetary policy function from the state, has done more than allow
for interest rate protection.
Consider one problem during the financial crisis and how LIBOR might
have been involved: the inability to reduce principal or interest payments
to mortgage borrowers. Many borrowers owned homes that were “under
water,” and hence worth less than their indebtedness. For such borrowers,
it could be rational to default on the loan. For others, the home equity
exceeded liability, but they found monthly payments to be untenable. This
may have been due to illness or unemployment. Alternatively, they may
have been in the practice of obtaining loans with a teaser rate and then
refinancing, but when such refinancing had become unavailable, their
monthly payments increased to an unaffordable level.
Many experts have argued that borrower and lender alike would benefit
from a modification under these circumstances, but modifications were
surprisingly rare. Explanations for this scarcity are many. Securitization of
loans meant that the initial lender, the loan servicer, and the entity entitled
to payment from the borrower were unlikely to be the same entity, raising
the complexity of modification. The loan servicers, those best positioned
to effect modifications, may have been afraid of liability to owners of the
loan for modifications adverse to their interests. It would have been
difficult and costly to obtain broad agreement amongst the owners of
various tranches of mortgage-backed securities (MBS), whose interests
were often adverse. Even where agreement or waiver could be cheaply
obtained, loan servicers sometimes had little incentive to propose a
workout since they also received payments for their work in addressing
defaulted mortgages. Likewise, it would be difficult for a consortium of
owners of the reference loan to actively monitor its servicer, allowing the
agent a great deal of discretion. Those coordination problems concern the
intra-security conflicts attendant to a single mortgage-backed security, but
the entire pool of mortgage-backed security owners may have had their
own coordination problem. With each defaulted mortgage, home values
nearby plummet and other mortgage-backed securities are endangered.
MBS investors, as a class, might have benefited if each had taken steps to
189. See supra text accompanying notes 108–09.
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modify loans in consideration of the benefit to other MBS investors. But
absent some mutual commitment, few investors would take account of
this positive externality.
Finally, many owners of mortgage-backed securities would dislike a
modification or writedown even if it resulted in fewer costly defaults. Such
modifications could designate the security as delinquent in payment, and
thus subject to credit downgrading. For regulated entities, such credit
downgrades can have severe impacts, such as triggering a need to raise
additional capital at a time when capital may not be forthcoming. Such
entities would prefer a “non-modification modification,” which is precisely
what LIBOR might have allowed.
LIBOR manipulation may have helped solve all of these problems.190
Under one possible account of LIBOR manipulation, the contributor
banks lowered their submissions in order to protect their reputations. If
this were true, it would have had the effect of lowering the LIBOR rate.
This in turn would have lowered the monthly payments and interest
obligations of all borrowers linked to LIBOR, which would have included
the vast majority of subprime borrowers, those most at risk of default.
Thus, successful downward manipulation of LIBOR could have arguably
achieved an efficient result from one perspective — overcoming
transactions costs and agency problems, as well as easing the stress on
borrowers precisely when they needed relief.
To be sure, not every account of the macro-effect of downward
LIBOR manipulation is so glowing. Bainbridge points out that low LIBOR
rates would fail to compensate lenders for the risks they assumed in
lending and would cause losses to many mutual funds and hedge funds.191
This is surely right, at least unless and until margins on the rate adjusted to
the new norm. But wondering whether this type of transfer helped or
harmed the crisis in the long-term is precisely the kind of question we
would ask if the Federal Reserve or a regulator had engaged in similar
easing or cramdowns.
These considerations are part of a broader normative question as to
whether political institutions should sometimes pressure financial entities
to engage in behavior that is inefficient or misleading, if it is perceived to
have some critical consequence for the economy. The “too big to fail”
debate may have an intriguing and analogous phenomenon in the world of
financial infrastructure: LIBOR may be “too big to end” and “too big to
regulate” simply because its essential importance as a sign of health for a
190. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 9 (stating that “the misreporting of the LIBOR data may actually have made the banking crisis worse in the long term”). See also Rosa M. AbrantesMetz et al., Tracking the Libor Rate, 18 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 893, 897–99 (2011); Rauterberg &
Verstein, supra note 40, at 104 (discussing harms of LIBOR manipulation).
191. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 9.

2013] PRIVATE REGULATION OF THE OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET

45

nation’s banks compromises the capacity of public regulators to govern it
objectively and demand accuracy at all times.
G.

Market Spaces Without Public or Private Regulation

In light of private regulation, the OTC derivatives market cannot be
accurately described as unregulated. Indeed, even in terms of state
regulation, the market has long been subject to important forms of
oversight and accountability at the entity level. In fact, the vast majority of
swaps dealers are regulated at the entity level as either banks or financial
firms.192
There are financial markets that come close to being genuinely
unregulated — subject to no robust rules of conduct in certain respects —
and they look very different from the OTC derivatives markets.
Appreciating the real, if limited, role of private regulation highlights the
unique character of those markets that have no public, private, or mixed
regulation. One interesting example is insider trading in the commodities
markets. In the commodities markets, insider trading is, for most purposes,
legal. “In contrast to the broad prohibition against insider trading found in
the securities laws, insider trading is considered an accepted and integral
practice in the commodity futures and derivatives markets.”193 While there
are perfunctory gestures at adopting different private norms,194 the
commodities markets simply do not have a domestic or transnational
192. See Jerry W. Markham, “Confederate Bonds,” “General Custer,” and the Regulation of Derivative
Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1994) (indicating, at that time, more than ninety
percent of the top fifty entities dealing in interest rate swaps were banks, financial firms, or affiliates
already subject to regulation); Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. and Inv. of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 11 (July 9, 2008) (statement of Katherine E. Dick,
Deputy Comptroller for Credit & Market Risk, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency), available
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-79a.pdf (noting that “the vast majority of significant
participants in these markets are regulated”). Additionally, OTC swap transactions remained subject
to antifraud provisions. See, e.g., EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS § 14.05 (10th ed. 2013); see also
Governance, supra note 104 (“As all contributor banks are regulated, they are responsible to their regulators, rather than BBA LIBOR Ltd. or the LPBAUG, for maintaining appropriate procedures for
contributing.”).
193. Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading: Legal Theories, Common
Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 151, 167 (2011) (“Not only does
the Commodity Exchange Act (the ‘CEA’) lack a prohibition against insider trading in commodities
(except with respect to certain individuals connected with the regulation, self-regulation, or exchange
governance of those markets), but the CEA actually accepts insider trading as a means to facilitate
efficient pricing of commodities.”). Front running certainly is illegal, but importantly, it does not
encompass anything like the full range of activities prohibited by insider trading laws in the equities
markets.
194. See, e.g., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES
REGULATION
(June
2010),
available
at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf. The International Organization of
Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) Core Principles prohibits insider trading.
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private body that effectively enforces an additional set of rules. This
unregulated aspect of the commodities markets highlights their basic
economic functions:
[T]he purpose of the commodity futures and derivatives markets is
to provide a forum for price discovery and risk management . . .
[and] as a joint report by the SEC and CFTC acknowledges, ‘permit
hedgers to use their non-public material information to protect
themselves against risks to their commodity positions.’ . . . ‘it would
defeat the market’s basic economic function — the hedging of
risk — to question whether trading on knowledge of one's own
position were permissible.’195
Different trading markets can serve dramatically different functions and
be served by different rules. While domestic equity markets with broad
societal participation may benefit from a regulatory prohibition against the
use of insider information, other markets, like the commodity futures
markets, exist in part to enable insiders to express their knowledge in trading strategies.196 Recognizing the significant differences between a market
without governmental regulation and one bereft of any regulation
whatsoever may well have a valuable lesson to teach as to the function of
the unregulated activity for that market.
H.

The Domesticity of Transnational Private Regulators

Transnational private regulation can only outrun the state so far.
Ultimately, even a transnational private regulator must be subject to at least
one (and potentially many) public regulatory regimes. This “home” or
domiciliary of the private regulator will often have its status solely as the
result of historical contingency, rather than as the result of conscious
choice by the regulated, third parties, or coordination by international
governments. Nonetheless, the law of this home state will have a
tremendously outsized power over what is now a truly transnational
regulatory regime. LIBOR provides a compelling example of this concept.
The Wheatley Review may be a largely reasonable set of
recommendations, but the power of the report and subsequent action by
the British government illustrate our structural observation. LIBOR is the
195. Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 193, at 168; see also Elizabeth L. Ritter, The Securitization of Commodities: Crossing a Gold (or Silver) Line in the Sand, 2 BUS. L. BRIEF 7, 8 (2005) (“‘insider trading’ means
something very different in the securities world than it means in the commodities world (where it's
actually desirable to have people with inside industry knowledge actively trading the marketplace —
that's how prices are discovered). Consequently, application of securities insider trading laws to
commodities trading is entirely inappropriate.”).
196. See, e.g., Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 193, at 168 (explaining that “commodity futures and
derivatives markets exist to facilitate trading based on information generated by participants’ inside
knowledge”).
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world’s short-term interest rate benchmark, and the LIBOR contributor
banks include over half of the world’s systemically important financial
institutions, less than one-quarter of which are based in the United
Kingdom.197 The United Kingdom also accounts for less than half of the
overall market value of global OTC derivatives.198 Yet, it is the British
government that retains the right to reformulate LIBOR, eliminate the
BBA’s control over it, and potentially (and disastrously) end LIBOR itself.
By accident of history, the U.K. government could have abolished the
world’s most prominent interest rate and thrown millions of contracts into
disarray.
However, exercising this leverage over international financial markets is
risky. OTC derivatives markets are localized in London and New York,199
and Bainbridge has claimed that aggressive control over LIBOR by the
U.K. Treasury or Bank of England would meet with “political hostility” in
the United States.200
From the perspective of the state under whose jurisdiction a
transnational private regulator is headquartered, unique possibilities
emerge. This jurisdictional reach provides a state with legal and regulatory
power over a transnational private regulator. Control over the home of a
transnational private regulator is thus a largely unacknowledged source of
international regulatory power. A nation that seeks a certain character of
regulation for the world’s derivatives markets may well find that its best
chance of achieving harmonized international regulation of that market is
through leveraging control over a transnational private regulator.
Professor Robert Wai has characterized the broader reality of which this
is just one instance — the necessity of even transnational private entities
being subject to some measure of public jurisdiction — as the
“touchdown” of transnational business, which seems to have partially
“lifted off ” from the plane of easy state law governance.201 Wai cogently
outlines several points of touchdown for private entities, including
utilization of domestic law regimes to enforce contracts and property
rights effectively, such as intellectual property or e-commerce.202 The
necessity of some “touchdown” entails that a public regulator will always
197. About Us, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bba.org.uk/about-us/member-list (last visited Aug. 6,
2013).
198. See, e.g., Benjamin M. Weadon, International Regulatory Arbitrage Resulting from Dodd–Frank
Derivatives Regulation, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 249, 259 (2012).
199. See Baker, supra note 9, at 1321.
200. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 40. Indeed, Bainbridge explicitly worries about “the
thorny question of which government would take the lead.” Id.
201. Biggins, supra note 54, at 1316; Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The
Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
209, 265 (2002).
202. Wai, supra note 201, at 265–66.
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be able to assert power over financial markets principally regulated by a
transnational private regulator. Likewise, Wai makes the point that these
“touchdown” points are public regulators’ opportunity to ensure that
transnational private entities (and private regulators) are fully responsive to
third-party concerns.203
John Biggins has drawn on Wai in the context of ISDA, noting “despite
the best efforts of ISDA and the industry to minimize ‘interpretative
interference’ through what I term ‘targeted touchdown’ . . . in what are
perceived to be ‘derivatives friendly’ jurisdictions, particularly England and
New York, such interference has been unavoidable.”204 Biggins emphasizes
the potential hazards of public interference in transnational private
regulation.
To our suggestion that LIBOR might be bolstered by U.S. property law,
Bainbridge says
[i]n the case of LIBOR, however, this suggestion makes no
sense . . . . While the U.S. government obviously has an interest in
such a globally and systemically important benchmark . . . it
nevertheless makes more sense for any new intellectual property
protections to come from LIBOR’s home base rather than the
U.S.205
Chris Brummer has expressed a similar view:
ultimately the LIBOR scandal is an instance where the UK appears
to be the most responsible authority since the British Bankers’
Association, a local organization, provided the unique product in
question . . . . London’s Financial Services Authority was not a host,
but was instead, for all practical purposes, the home regulator.206
This domestic power allows states to influence, shirk, and avoid
responsibility for either. Brummer is right that: “[t]he home regulator
won’t get off scot-free [if there is a problem for the host country], but it
will escape a lot of the scrutiny.”207
The regulator with the greatest power to affect the transnational private
regulation regime may sometimes have the least incentive to do so. If the
home state is the beneficiary of the current transnational private regulator,
then there is an incentive to allow its misbehavior at the expense of others.
Thus, the Federal Reserve of New York may fail to curtail LIBOR
203. Id.
204. Biggins, supra note 54, at 1298.
205. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 115, at 47.
206. Chris Brummer, London Is Better Off Reformed (LIBOR), HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2012,
1:53
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-brummer/london-bankingreform_b_1708229.html.
207. Id.
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manipulation insofar as the beneficiaries are New York banks and the
losers are global swap participants.
The global reach of regulation is exemplified by aspects of UBS’s
LIBOR settlement with the CFTC and the U.K. Financial Services
Authority.208 In that case, a U.S. regulator dictated to a Swiss Bank how its
Japanese affiliate would communicate with a U.K. trade organization in
connection with a benchmark used around the world. Thus, the
substantive oversight of the benchmark-setting process is often achieved
on a firm-by-firm basis, rather than at a national or industry level, where
regulators have traditionally had power over the relevant firms.
I.

Noticing Harmony

ISDA and the BBA have achieved massive harmonization of global
derivatives norms. Realizing that there is non-state harmonization reveals
the possibility that increased harmonization of state regulation may come
at the expense of extant private regulatory harmony. It is an open question
in any given instance whether that increased harmonization will result in a
net increase in regulatory harmonization. For example, Dodd–Frank’s
efforts to create regulatory order has diverted transactions from betterharmonized spaces to less-harmonized ones. Under Dodd–Frank, many
more OTC swaps must be cleared at registered clearinghouses, and entities
that clear swaps through a Derivatives Clearing Organization must be
registered Futures Commission Merchants.209 Cleared swaps rely on
futures account agreements rather than ISDA documentation, a fact that
has resulted in some surprise and confusion to firms familiar with global
swaps practice.210 These changes resulted in a fragmentation of the
practical order. This disharmony has since been managed by private
regulators.211 But policymakers must be aware that efforts to increase state
regulatory harmony, even when they succeed on their own terms, may
decrease harmonization simpliciter.

208. See, e.g., UBS AG & UBS Sec. Japan Co., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 32,481 (Dec. 19,
2012) (order instituting proceedings pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange
Act
making
findings
and
imposing
remedial
sanctions),
available
at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfub
sorder121912.pdf.
209. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 724a, 124 Stat. 1376, 1682 (2010).
210. See, e.g., Lauren Teigland-Hunt, When Worlds Collide: An Overview of New Industry Documentation
for Cleared Swaps, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Nov. 2012, at 1.
211. Id. at 5. FIA and ISDA published a standard form addendum to futures clearing agreements
to address cleared swaps. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The ambition of this Article was to explore the implications of a
change in perspective on global derivatives regulation. The stage was set by
reviewing the scholarly literature that recognizes authoritative governance
of market activity, which is produced by private actors, as a genuine form
of regulation. We then analyzed the BBA and ISDA as transnational
private regulators that have produced coordinated, pervasive, and
harmonizing norms for OTC derivatives. We suggested that this picture is
more accurate than the history of OTC derivatives that has often been
promoted in the media and scholarly literature, in which OTC derivatives
were seen as subject to virtually no regulation at all. From this perspective,
we articulated the many implications for future regulatory reform,
including recognizing preexisting regulatory harmony, appreciating the
extent to which trade-offs involved in regulatory proposals have already
been considered, and muting the urge to willy-nilly regulate in times of
crisis. With these tools, there can be modest hope for superior future
governance of OTC derivatives.

